Indian Penal Code (1860) – IPC Sections

⁸ [(1) any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India;

(2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wher­ever it may be;]

⁹ [(3) any person in any place without and beyond India committing offence targeting a computer resource located in India .] ¹⁰ [ Explanation .—In this section— ¹¹ [Illustration] ¹² [***] A, ¹³ [who is ¹⁴ [a citizen of India ] ], commits a murder in Uganda. He can be tried and convicted of murder in any place in ¹⁵ [ India ] in which he may be found. ¹⁶ [***]

(a) The sections, in this Code, which contain definitions of offences, do not express that a child under seven years of age cannot commit such offences, but the definitions are to be under­stood subject to the general exception which provides that noth­ing shall be an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.

(b) A, a police-officer, without warrant, apprehends Z, who has committed murder. Here A is not guilty of the offence of wrongful confinement; for he was bound by law to apprehend Z and there­fore the case falls within the general exception which provides that “nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is bound by law to do it”.

(a) A Collector exercising jurisdiction in a suit under Act 10 of 1859, is a Judge.

(b) A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power to sentence to fine or imprisonment, with or without appeal, is a Judge.

(c) A member of a panchayat which has power, under ²¹ Regulation VII, 1816, of the Madras Code, to try and determine suits, is a Judge.

(d) A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power only to commit for trial to another Court, is not a Judge.

(Second) —Every Commissioned Officer in the Military, ²⁴ [Naval or Air] Forces ²⁵ [ ²⁶ [***] of India];

²⁷ [(Third) —Every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions;]

(Fourth) — Every officer of a Court of Justice ²⁸ [(including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner)] whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court, and every person specially authorized by a Court of Justice to perform any of such duties;

(Fifth) — Every juryman, assessor, or member of a panchayat assist­ing a Court of Justice or public servant;

(Sixth) — Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or by any other competent public authority;

(Seventh) —Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement;

(Eighth) — Every officer of ²⁹ [the Government] whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of of­fences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience;

(Ninth) — Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of ²⁹ [the Govern­ment], or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of ²⁹ [the Government], or to execute any revenue process, or to investigate, or to report, on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of ²⁹ [the Government], or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of ²⁹ [the Govern­ment], or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of ²⁹ [the Government] ³⁰ [***];

(Tenth) — Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, authenti­cate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district;

³¹ [(Eleventh) —Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an elec­toral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election;]

³² [(Twelfth) —Every person—

(Rajasthan) —In section 21, after clause twelfth, the following new clause shall be added, namely:— “Thirteenth.—Every person employed or engaged by any public body in the conduct and supervision of any examination recognised or approved under any law. Explanation.—The expression ‘Public Body’ includes—

(1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.]

(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z dies from the effects of the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B intentionally co-operate in the commission of murder and as each of them does an act by which the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate.

(b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner, alternatively for six hours at a time. A and B, intend­ing to cause Z’s death, knowingly co-operate in causing that effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attend­ance, to furnish Z with food supplied to them for that purpose, Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z.

(c) A, a jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death, illegally omits to supply Z with food; in conse­quence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation is not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without collusion or co-operation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely thereby to cause Z’s death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not co-operate with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder.

(First) — Death; 1[Secondly.—Imprisonment for life;] 2[***]

(Fourthly) —Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:—

(Fifthly) —Forfeiture of property;

(Sixthly) —Fine.

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3), any reference to “transportation for life” in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument or order having effect by virtue of any such law or of any enactment repealed shall be construed as a reference to “imprisonment for life”.

(2) In every case in which a sentence of transportation for a term has been passed before the commencement of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2[1955] (26 of 1955), the offender shall be dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term.

(3) Any reference to transportation for a term or to transporta­tion for any shorter term (by whatever name called) in any other law for the time being in force shall be deemed to have been omitted.

(4) Any reference to “transportation” in any other law for the time being in force shall,—

(a) in cases where the sentence is a sentence of death or is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the execu­tive power of the Union extends, the Central Government; and

(b) in cases where the sentence (whether of death or not) is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced.]

(a) A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have commit­ted the offence of voluntarily causing hurt to Z by the whole beating, and also by each of the blows which make up the whole beating. If A were liable to punishment for every blow, he might be imprisoned for fifty years, one for each blow. But he is liable only to one punishment for the whole beating.

(b) But if, while A is beating Z, Y interferes, and A intention­ally strikes Y, here, as the blow given to Y is no part of the act whereby A voluntarily causes hurt to Z, A is liable to one punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to Z, and to another for the blow given to Y.

(a) by a Court in 2[India], of an offence punishable under Chap­ter XII or Chapter XVII of this Code with imprisonment of either description for a term of three years or upwards, 3[***] 3[***] shall be guilty of any offence punishable under either of those Chapters with like imprisonment for the like term, shall be subject for every such subsequent offence to 4[imprisonment for life], or to imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years.]

(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law. A has com­mitted no offence.

(b) A, an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.

(a) A, the captain of a steam vessel, suddenly and without any fault or negligence on his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down to boat B, with twenty or thirty passengers on board, unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that, by changing his course, he must incur risk of running down a boat C with only two passengers on board, which he may possibly clear. Here, if A alters his course without any intention to run down the boat C and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run down the boat C by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down the boat C.

(b) A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from spreading. He does this with the intention in good faith of saving human life or property. Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so immi­nent as to excuse A’s act. A is not guilty of the offence.

(First) — That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;

(Secondly) —That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmi­ty;

(Thirdly) — That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or griev­ous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

(Fourthly) —That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend. Illustration A, in good faith, for his child’s benefit without his child’s consent, has his child cut for the stone by a surgeon. Knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child’s death, but not intending to cause the child’s death. A is within the excep­tion, inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child.

(First) — That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death;

(Secondly) —That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmi­ty;

(Thirdly) -— That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt;

(Fourthly) —That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend. Illustrations

(First) — His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;

(Secondly) —The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, rob­bery, mischief or criminal trespass.

(a) Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.

(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter Z, in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting under that misconcep­tion.

(First) — Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

(Secondly) —Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehen­sion that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

(Thirdly) — An assault with the intention of committing rape;

(Fourthly) —An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;

(Fifthly) — An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abduct­ing;

(Sixthly) — An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.

(First) — Robbery;

(Secondly) —House-breaking by night;

(Thirdly) — Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwell­ing, or as a place for the custody of property;

(Fourthly) —Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circum­stances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or griev­ous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private de­fence is not exercised. STATE AMENDMENTS

(Karnataka) —(1) In section 103, in clause Thirdly,—

(Maharashtra) —In section 103, add the following at the end, namely:— “Fifthly.—Mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on any property used or intended to be used for the purposes of Government or any local authority, statutory body, company owned or controlled by Government, railway or tramway, or on any vehicle used or adapted to be used, for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward”. [Vide Maharashtra Act 19 of 1971, sec. 26 (w.e.f. 31-12-1971)]. Uttar Pradesh.—In section 103, after clause fourthly, add the following clause, namely:— “Fifthly.—Mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on—

(First) — Instigates any person to do that thing; or

(Secondly) —Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

(Thirdly) — Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to dis­close, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Illustration A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C. Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.

(a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A is guilty of abetting B to commit murder.

(b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of the instigation stabs D. D recovers from the wound. A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder. Explanation 3.—It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge. Illustrations

(a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a lunatic to commit an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence, and having the same intention as A. Here A, whether the act be committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence.

(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to do an act which causes Z’s death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the act in the absence of A and thereby causes Z’s death. Here, though B was not capable by law of committing an offence, A is liable to be punished in the same manner as if B had been capable by law of committing an offence, and had committed murder, and he is therefore subject to the punishment of death.

(c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house, B, in conse­quence of the unsoundness of his mind, being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law, sets fire to the house in consequence of A’s instigation. B has committed no offence, but A is guilty of abetting the offence of setting fire to a dwelling-house, and is liable to the punishment, provided for that offence.

(d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed, instigates B to take property belonging to Z out of Z’s possession. A induces B to believe that the property belongs to A. B takes the property out of Z’s possession, in good faith, believing it to be A’s property. B, acting under this misconception, does not take dishonestly, and therefore does not commit theft. But A is guilty of abetting theft, and is liable to the same punishment as if B had committed theft. Explanation 4.—The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also as offence. Illustration A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B accordingly insti­gates C to murder Z, and C commits that offence in consequence of B’s instigation. B is liable to be punished for his offence with the punishment for murder; and, as A instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable to the same punishment. Explanation 5.—It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed. Illustration A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed that A shall administer the poison. B then explains the plan to C men­tioning that a third person is to administer the poison, but without mentioning A’s name. C agrees to procure the poison, and procures and delivers it to B for the purpose of its being used in the manner explained. A administers the poison; Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and C have not conspired together, yet C has been engaged in the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been murdered. C has therefore committed the offence defined in this section and is liable to the punishment for murder.

(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the exercise of B’s official functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence defined in section 161.

(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence of the instigation, commits that offence. A is guilty of abetting that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as B.

(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A in pursuance of the conspira­cy, procures the poison and delivers it to B in order that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the conspiracy, adminis­ters the poison to Z in A’s absence and thereby causes Z’s death. Here B is guilty of murder. A is guilty of abetting that offence by conspiracy, and is liable to the punishment for murder. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Punishment—Same as for offence abetted—According as offence abetted is cognizable or non-cognizable—According as offence abetted is bailable or non-bailable—Triable by court by which offence abetted is triable—Non-compoundable.

(Proviso) —Provided the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed under the influence of the instiga­tion, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment. Illustrations

(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the exercise of B’s official functions. B refuses to accept the bribe. A is punishable under this sec­tion.

(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. Here, if B does not give false evidence, A has nevertheless committed the offence defined in this section, and is punishable accordingly.

(c) A, a police-officer, whose duty it is to prevent robbery, abets the commission of robbery. Here, though the robbery be not committed, A is liable to one-half of the longest term of impris­onment provided for that offence, and also to fine.

(d) B abets the commission of a robbery by A, a police-officer, whose duty it is to prevent that offence. Here, though the rob­bery be not committed, B is liable to one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence of robbery, and also to fine. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Para I:—Punishment—Imprisonment extending to a quarter part of the longest term, provided for the offence, or fine, or both—Accord­ing to offence abetted is cognizable or non-cognizable—According as offence abetted is bailable or non-bailable—Triable by court by which offence abetted is triable—Non-compoundable. Para II: Punishment—Imprisonment extending to half of the longest term, provided for the offence, or fine, or both—According as offence abetted is cognizable or non-cognizable—According as offence abetted is bailable or non-bailable—Triable by court by which offence abetted is triable—Non-compoundable.

(1) an illegal act, or

(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agree­ment is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.]

(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, 2[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.]

(Exception) —This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is given by a wife to her husband.

(First) — To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1[the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legis­lature of any State], or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or

(Second) — To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or

(Third) — To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or

(Fourth) — By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or

(Fifth) — By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation.—An assembly which was not unlawful when it assem­bled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.

(1) Whoever—

(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise,—

(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1), in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the perform­ance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.]

¹⁶³ [(a) “candidate” means a person who has been nominated as a candidate at an election;]

(b) “electoral right” means the right of a person to stand, or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being, a candidate or to vote or refrain from voting at any election.]

(1) Whoever—

(2) A person who offers, or agrees to give, or offers or attempts to procure, a gratification shall be deemed to give a gratifica­tion.

(3) A person who obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain a gratification shall be deemed to accept a gratification, and a person who accepts a gratification as a motive for doing what he does not intend to do, or as a reward for doing what he has not done, shall be deemed to have accepted the gratification as a reward.]

(1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right commits the offence of undue influence at an election.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), whoever—

(3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this section.]

(a) A, being legally bound to appear before the 1[High Court] at Calcutta, in obedience to a subpoena issuing from that Court, intentionally omits to appear. A has committed the offence de­fined in this section.

(b) A, being legally bound to appear before a ¹⁷⁶ [District Judge], as a witness, in obedience to a summons issued by that 2[District Judge] intentionally omits to appear. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(1) of section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both, and where a declaration has been made under sub‑section (4) of that section pronouncing him as a proclaimed offender, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.]

(1) of section 565 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) with imprison­ment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.]

(a) A, a landholder, knowing of the commission of a murder within the limits of his estate, wilfully misinforms the Magistrate of the district that the death has occurred by accident in conse­quence of the bite of a snake. A is guilty of the offence defined in this section.

(b) A, a village watchman, knowing that a considerable body of strangers has passed through his village in order to commit a dacoity in the house of Z, a wealthy merchant residing in a neighbouring place, and being bound under clause, 5, section VII, 1[Regulation III, 1821], of the Bengal Code, to give early and punctual information of the above fact to the officer of the nearest police station, wilfully misinforms the police officer that a body of suspicious characters passed through the village with a view to commit dacoity in a certain distant place in a different direction. Here A is guilty of the offence defined in the later part of this section. 2[Explanation.—In section 176 and in this section the word “offence” includes any act committed at any place out of 3[India], which, if committed in 3[India], would be punishable under any of the following sections, namely, 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459 and 460; and the word “offender” includes any person who is alleged to have been guilty of any such act.]

(a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or

(b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Illustrations

(a) A informs a Magistrate that Z, a police-officer, subordinate to such Magistrate, has been guilty of neglect of duty or miscon­duct, knowing such information to be false, and knowing it to be likely that the information will cause the Magistrate to dismiss Z. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(b) A falsely informs a public servant that Z has contraband salt in a secret place knowing such information to be false, and knowing that it is likely that the consequence of the information will be a search of Z’s premises, attended with annoyance to Z. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(c) A falsely informs a policeman that he has been assaulted and robbed in the neighbourhood of a particular village. He does not mention the name of any person as one of his assistants, but knows it to be likely that in consequence of this information the police will make enquiries and institute searches in the village to the annoyance of the villages or some of them. A has committed an offence under this section.]

(a) A, in support of a just claim which B has against Z for one thousand rupees, falsely swears on a trial that he heard Z admit the justice of B’s claim. A has given false evidence.

(b) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he believes a certain signature to be the handwriting of Z, when he does not believe it to be the handwriting of Z. Here A states that which he knows to be false, and therefore gives false evidence.

(c) A, knowing the general character of Z’s handwriting, states that he believes a certain signature to be the handwriting of Z; A in good faith believing it to be so. Here A’s statement is merely as to his belief, and is true as to his belief, and there­fore, although the signature may not be the handwriting of Z, A has not given false evidence.

(d) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he knows that Z was at a particular place on a particular day, not knowing anything upon the subject. A gives false evidence whether Z was at that place on the day named or not.

(e) A, an interpreter or translator, gives or certifies as a true interpretation or translation of a statement or document which he is bound by oath to interpret or translate truly, that which is not and which he does not believe to be a true interpretation or translation. A has given false evidence.

(a) A, puts jewels into a box belonging to Z, with the intention that they may be found in that box, and that this circumstance may cause Z to be convicted of theft. A has fabricated false evidence.

(b) A makes a false entry in his shop-book for the purpose of using it as corroborative evidence in a Court of Justice. A has fabricated false evidence.

(c) A, with the intention of causing Z to be convicted of a criminal conspiracy, writes a letter in imitation of Z’s handwriting, purporting to be addressed to an accomplice in such criminal conspiracy, and puts the letter in a place which he knows that the officers of the Police are likely to search. A has fabricated false evidence.

(Exception) —This provision shall not extend to any case in which the harbour or concealment is by the husband or wife of the offender. Illustration A, knowing that B has committed dacoity, knowingly conceals B in order to screen him from legal punishment. Here, as B is liable to 1[imprisonment for life], A is liable to imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding three years, and is also liable to fine.

(Exception) —This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour or concealment is by the husband or wife of the person to be apprehended.

(Exception) —This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is by the husband or wife of the offender.]

(a) if he does so intentionally, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and

(b) if he does so negligently, with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.]

(1) Whoever prints or publishes the name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an offence under section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C or section 376D is alleged or found to have been committed (hereafter in this section referred to as the victim) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) extends to any printing or publi­cation of the name or any matter which may make known the identi­ty of the victim if such printing or publication is—

(3) Whoever prints or publishes any matter in relation to any proceeding before a court with respect to an offence referred to in sub-section (1) without the previous permission of such Court shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—The printing or publication of the judgment of any High Court or the Supreme Court does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section.]

(a) in addition to the punishment to which the offender would be liable on a conviction for the offence with which he has been charged; and

(b) without prejudice to the power of the Court to order forfeiture of the bond.]

(a) Cowries are not coin.

(b) Lumps of unstamped copper, though used as money, are not coin.

(c) Medals are not coin, in as much as they are not intended to be used as money.

(d) The coin denomi­nated as the Company’s rupee is 3[Indian coin].

²³⁷ [(e) The “Farukha­bad rupee” which was formerly used as money under the authority of the Government of India is 4[Indian coin] although it is no longer so used].

(1) Whoever—

(2) Any such stamps, die, plate, instrument or materials in the possession of any person for making any fictitious stamp 2[may be seized and, if seized] shall be forfeited.

(3) In this section “fictitious stamp” means any stamp falsely purporting to be issued by the Government for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, or any facsimile or imitation or representation, whether on paper or otherwise, of any stamp issued by Government for that purpose.

(4) In this section and also in sections 255 to 263, both inclu­sive, the word “Government”, when used in connection with, or in reference to, any stamp issued for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, shall, notwithstanding anything in section 17, be deemed to include the person or persons authorized by law to administer executive Government in any part of India, and also in any part of Her Majesty’s dominions or in any foreign country.]

(1) For the purposes of sub-section (2), a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object, shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious or appeals to the pruri­ent interest or if its effect, or (where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one of its items, is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt person, who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.]

²⁶² [(2) ] Whoever—

(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or

(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.]

(a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z believing the ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.

(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it A, intend­ing to cause, or knowing it to be likely to cause Z’s death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.

(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B who is behind a bush; A not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death. Explanation 1.—A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death. Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented. Explanation 3.—The causing of the death of child in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.

(Secondly) —If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—

(Thirdly) —If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be in­flicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—

(Fourthly) —If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Illustrations

(First) —That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily pro­voked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.

(Secondly) —That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exer­cise of the powers of such public servant.

(Thirdly) —That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. Illustrations

(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or har­assment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprison­ment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.]

(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circum­stances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.

(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.

(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of 3[the first paragraph of] this section.

(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(First) — Emasculation.

(Secondly) —Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

(Thirdly) — Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear,

(Fourthly) —Privation of any member or joint.

(Fifthly) — Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.

(Sixthly) — Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

(Seventhly) —Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

(Eighthly) —Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.

(a) A, a police-officer, tortures Z in order to induce Z to confess that he committed a crime. A is guilty of an offence under this section.

(b) A, a police-officer, tortures B to induce him to point out where certain stolen property is deposited. A is guilty of an offence under this section.

(c) A, a revenue officer, tortures Z in order to compel him to pay certain arrears of revenue due from Z. A is guilty of an offence under this section.

(d) A, a zamindar, tortures a raiyat in order to compel him to pay his rent. A is guilty of an offence under this section. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Punishment—Imprisonment for 7 years and fine—Cognizable—Bail­able—Triable by Magistrate of the first class—Non-compoundable.

(Exception) —The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section. Illustration A obstructs a path along which Z has a right to pass. A not believing in good faith that he has a right to stop the path. Z is thereby prevented from passing. A wrongfully restrains Z.

(First) — By his own bodily power.

(Secondly) —By disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part, or on the part of any other person.

(Thirdly) — By inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move.

(a) Z is sitting in a moored boat on a river. A unfastens the moorings, and thus intentionally causes the boat to drift down the stream. Here A intentionally causes motion to Z, and he does this by disposing substances in such a manner that the motion is produced without any other act on any person’s part. A has there­fore intentionally used force to Z; and if he has done so without Z’s consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or in­tending or knowing it to be likely that this use of force will cause injury, fear or annoyance to Z, A has used criminal force to Z.

(b) Z is riding in a chariot. A lashes Z’s horses, and thereby causes them to quicken their pace. Here Z has caused change of motion to Z by inducing the animals to change their motion. A has therefore used force to Z; and if A has done this without Z’s consent, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby injure, frighten or annoy Z, A has used criminal force to Z.

(c) Z is riding in a palanquin. A, intending to rob Z, seizes the pole and stops the palanquin. Here A has caused cessation of motion to Z, and he has done this by his own bodily power. A has therefore used force to Z; and as A has acted thus intentionally, without Z’s consent, in order to the commission of an offence. A has used criminal force to Z.

(d) A intentionally pushes against Z in the street. Here A has by his own bodily power moved his own person so as to bring it into contact with Z. He has therefore intentionally used force to Z; and if he has done so without Z’s consent, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby injure, frighten or annoy Z, he has used criminal force to Z.

(e) A throws a stone, intending or knowing it to be likely that the stone will be thus brought into contact with Z, or with Z’s clothes, or with something carried by Z, or that it will strike water and dash up the water against Z’s clothes or something carried by Z. Here, if the throwing of the stone produce the effect of causing any substance to come into contact with Z, or Z’s clothes. A has used force to Z; and if he did so without Z’s consent, intending thereby to injure, frighten or annoy Z, he has used criminal force to Z.

(f) A intentionally pulls up a woman’s veil. Here A intentionally uses force to her, and if he does so without her consent intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby injure, frighten or annoy her, he has used criminal force to her.

(g) Z is bathing, A pours into the bath water which he knows to be boiling. Here A intentionally by his own bodily power causes such motion in the boiling water as brings that water into con­tact with Z, or with other water so situated that such contact must affect Z’s sense of feeling; A has therefore intentionally used force to Z; and if he has done this without Z’s consent intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause injury, fear, or annoyance to Z, A has used criminal force.

(h) A incites a dog to spring upon Z, without Z’s consent. Here, if A intends to cause injury, fear or annoyance to Z, he uses criminal force to Z.

(a) A shakes his fist at Z, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause Z to believe that A is about to strike Z, A has committed an assault.

(b) A begins to unloose the muzzle of a ferocious dog, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause Z to believe that he is about to cause the dog to attack Z. A has committed an assault upon Z.

(c) A takes up a stick, saying to Z, “I will give you a beating”. Here, though the words used by A could in no case amount to an assault, and though the mere gesture, unaccompanied by any other circumstances, might not amount to an assault, the gesture ex­plained by the words may amount to an assault.

(Exception) —This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an ille­gitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose. STATE AMENDMENT

(Manipur) —In section 361 for the words ‘eighteen’ substitute the word ‘fifteen’. [Vide Manipur Act 30 of 1950, sec. 3 (w.e.f. 16-4-1950), read with Act 81 of 1971, sec. 3 (w.e.f. 25-1-1972)]. COMMENTS Inducement not immediate cause The accused was charged for kidnapping a minor girl, below 15 years of age from the lawful guardianship of her father. It was established that the accused had an earlier stage solicited or induced minor girl to leave her father’s protection by conveying or indicating an encouraging suggestion, that he would give her shelter. Holding the accused liable for kidnapping under section 363, the Supreme Court said that the mere circumstances that his act was not the immediate cause of her leaving her parental home or guardian’s custody would constitute no valid defence and would not absolve him from the offence of kidnapping. The question truly falls for determination on the facts and circumstances of each case; Thakorilal D Vadgama v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1973 SC 2314: (1973) 2 SCC 413. Lawful guardian Where facts indicate that a girl left her father’s protection, knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing and voluntarily joined the accused, the offence of kidnapping cannot be said to have been made out; S. Varadrajan v. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942. Use of word ‘keeping’: Meaning of The use of the word “keeping” in the context connotes the idea of charge, protection, maintenance and control; further the guardian’s charge and control appears to be compatible with the independence of action and movement in the minor, the guardian’s protection and control of the minor being available, whenever necessity arises. On plain reading of this section the consent of the minor who is taken or enticed is wholly immaterial: it is only the guardian’s consent which takes the case out of its purview. Nor is it necessary that the taking or enticing must be shown to have been by means of force or fraud. Persuasion by the accused person which creates willingness on the part of the minor to be taken out of the keeping of the lawful guardian would be sufficient to attract the section; Prakash v. State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 227.

(1) Whoever kidnaps any minor or, not being the lawful guardian of a minor, obtains the custody of the minor, in order that such minor may be employed or used for the purpose of begging shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) Whoever maims any minor in order that such minor may be employed or used for the purposes of begging shall be punishable with imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

(3) Where any person, not being the lawful guardian of a minor, employs or uses such minor for the purposes of begging, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he kidnapped or otherwise obtained the custody of that minor in order that the minor might be employed or used for the purposes of begging.

(4) In this section,—

(a) A kidnaps Z from 2[India], intending or knowing it to be likely that Z may be sacrificed to an idol. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(b) A forcibly carries or entices B away from his home in order that B may be murdered. A has committed the offence defined in this section. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Punishment—Imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Ses­sion—Non-compoundable.

(First) — Against her will.

(Secondly) —Without her consent.

(Thirdly) — With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.

(Fourthly) —With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be law­fully married.

(Fifthly) — With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupe­fying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.

(Sixthly) — With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation.—Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape.

(Exception) —Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.] STATE AMENDMENT

(Manipur) —(a) in clause sixthly, for the word “sixteen” substitute the word “fourteen”; and

(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the women raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years.

(2) Whoever,—

(a) A cuts down a tree on Z’s ground, with the intention of dis­honestly taking the tree out of Z’s possession without Z’s con­sent. Here, as soon as A has severed the tree in order to such taking, he has committed theft.

(b) A puts a bait for dogs in his pocket, and thus induces Z’s dog to follow it. Here, if A’s intention be dishonestly to take the dog out of Z’s possession without Z’s consent. A has commit­ted theft as soon as Z’s dog has begun to follow A.

(c) A meets a bullock carrying a box of treasure. He drives the bullock in a certain direction, in order that he may dishonestly take the treasure. As soon as the bullock begins to move, A has committed theft of the treasure.

(d) A, being Z’s servant, and entrusted by Z with the care of Z’s plate, dishonestly runs away with the plate, without Z’s consent. A has committed theft.

(e) Z, going on a journey, entrusts his plate to A, the keeper of the warehouse, till Z shall return. A carries the plate to a goldsmith and sells it. Here the plate was not in Z’s possession. It could not therefore be taken out of Z’s possession, and A has not committed theft, though he may have committed criminal breach of trust.

(f) A finds a ring belonging to Z on a table in the house which Z occupies. Here the ring is in Z’s possession, and if A dishonest­ly removes it, A commits theft.

(g) A finds a ring lying on the highroad, not in the possession of any person. A by taking it, commits no theft, though he may commit criminal misappropriation of property.

(h) A sees a ring belonging to Z lying on a table in Z’s house. Not venturing to misappropriate the ring immediately for fear of search and detection, A hides the ring in a place where it is highly improbable that it will ever be found by Z, with the intention of taking the ring from the hiding place and selling it when the loss is forgotten. Here A, at the time of first moving the ring, commits theft.

(i) A delivers his watch to Z, a jeweller, to be regulated. Z carries it to his shop. A, not owing to the jeweller any debt for which the jeweller might lawfully detain the watch as a security, enters the shop openly, takes his watch by force out of Z’s hand, and carries it away. Here A, though he may have committed crimi­nal trespass and assault, has not committed theft, in as much as what he did was not done dishonestly.

(j) If A owes money to Z for repairing the watch, and if Z re­tains the watch lawfully as a security for the debt, and A takes the watch out of Z’s possession, with the intention of depriving Z of the property as a security for his debt, he commits theft, in as much as he takes it dishonestly.

(k) Again, if A, having pawned his watch to Z, takes it out of Z’s possession without Z’s consent, not having paid what he borrowed on the watch, he commits theft, though the watch is his own property in as much as he takes it dishonestly.

(l) A takes an article belonging to Z out of Z’s possession, without Z’s consent, with the intention of keeping it until he obtains money from Z as a reward for its restoration. Here A takes dishonestly; A has therefore committed theft.

(m) A, being on friendly terms with Z, goes into Z’s library in Z’s absence, and takes away a book without Z’s express consent for the purpose merely of reading it, and with the intention of returning it. Here, it is probable that A may have conceived that he had Z’s implied consent to use Z’s book. If this was A’s impression, A has not committed theft.

(n) A asks charity from Z’s wife. She gives A money, food and clothes, which A knows to belong to Z her husband. Here it is probable that A may conceive that Z’s wife is authorised to give away alms. If this was A’s impression, A has not committed theft.

(o) A is the paramour of Z’s wife. She gives a valuable property, which A knows to belong to her husband Z, and to be such property as she has no authority from Z to give. If A takes the property dishonestly, he commits theft.

(p) A, in good faith, believing property belonging to Z to be A’s own property, takes that property out of B’s possession. Here, as A does not take dishonestly, he does not commit theft. Comments Ingredients The delay in hearing of appeal for long period is no cause for not interfering with an order of acquittal which was based on conjectures and surmises, resulting in gross failure of justice; State of Rajasthan v. Shanker, 2000 Cr LJ 266 (Raj). Taking need not be permanent It is not necessary that the taking should be of a permanent character, or that the accused should have derived any profit. A temporary removal of an office file from the office of a Chief Engineer and making it available to a private person for a day or two amounts to the offence of theft; Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094.

(a) A commits theft on property in Z’s possession; and, while committing this theft, he has a loaded pistol under his garment, having provided this pistol for the purpose of hurting Z in case Z should resist. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(b) A picks Z’s pocket, having posted several of his companions near him, in order that they may restrain Z, if Z should perceive what is passing and should resist, or should attempt to apprehend A. A has committed the offence defined in this section. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Punishment—Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cogniza­ble—Non-bailable—Triable by Magistrate of the first class—Non-compoundable.

(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.

(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z’s child in wrongful con­finement, unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A. Z signs and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.

(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z’s field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.

(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z signs and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has committed extor­tion.

(a) A holds Z down and fraudulently takes Z’s money and jewels from Z’s clothes without Z’s consent. Here A has committed theft, and in order to the committing of that theft, has voluntarily caused wrongful restraint to Z. A has therefore committed rob­bery.

(b) A meets Z on the high roads, shows a pistol, and demands Z’s purse. Z in consequence, surrenders his purse. Here A has extort­ed the purse from Z by putting him in fear of instant hurt, and being at the time of committing the extortion in his presence. A has therefore committed robbery.

(c) A meets Z and Z’s child on the high road. A takes the child and threatens to fling it down a precipice, unless Z delivers his purse. Z, in consequence delivers his purse. Here A has extorted the purse from Z, by causing Z to be in fear of instant hurt to the child who is there present. A has therefore committed robbery on Z.

(d) A obtains property from Z by saying—“Your child is in the hands of my gang, and will be put to death unless you send us ten thousand rupees”. This is extortion, and punishable as such; but it is not robbery, unless Z is put in fear of the instant death of his child. COMMENTS In order that theft may constitute robbery, prosecution has to establish—

(a) if in order to the committing of theft; or

(b) in committing the theft; or

(c) in carrying away or attempting to carry away property ob­tained by theft;

(d) the offender for that end i.e. any of the ends contemplated by (a) to (c);

(e) voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint. In other words, theft would only be robbery if for any of the ends mentioned in (a) to (c) the offender voluntarily causes or at­tempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint. If the ends does not fall within (a) to (c) but, the offender still causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint, the offence would not be robbery. That (a) or (b) or (c) have to be read conjunctively with (d) and (e). It is only when (a) or (b) or (c) co-exist with (d) and (e) or there is a nexus between any of them and (d), (e) would amount to robbery; State of Maharashtra v. Joseph Mingel Koli, (1997) 2 Crimes 228 (Bom).

(a) A takes property belonging to Z out of Z’s possession, in good faith, believing, at any time when he takes it, that the property belongs to himself. A is not guilty of theft; but if A, after discovering his mistake, dishonestly appropriates the property to his own use, he is guilty of an offence under this section.

(b) A, being on friendly terms with Z, goes into Z’s library in Z’s absence, and takes away a book without Z’s express consent. Here, if A was under the impression that he had Z’s implied consent to take the book for the purpose of reading it, A has not committed theft. But, if A afterwards sells the book for his own benefit, he is guilty of an offence under this section.

(c) A and B, being joint owners of a horse, A takes the horse out of B’s possession, intending to use it. Here, as A has a right to use the horse, he does not dishonestly misappropriate it. But, if A sells the horse and appropriates the whole proceeds to his own use, he is guilty of an offence under this section. Explanation I.—A dishonest misappropriation for a time only is a misappropriation with the meaning of this section. Illustration A finds a Government promissory note belonging to Z, bearing a blank endorsement. A, knowing that the note belongs to Z, pledges it with a banker as a security for a loan, intending at a future time to restore it to Z. A has committed an offence under this section. Explanation 2.—A person who finds property not in the possession of any other person, and takes such property for the purpose of protecting if for, or of restoring it to, the owner does not take or misappropriate it dishonestly, and is not guilty of an of­fence; but he is guilty of the offence above defined, if he appropriates it to his own use, when he knows or has the means of discovering the owner, or before he has used reasonable means to discover and give notice to the owner and has kept the proper­ty a reasonable time to enable the owner to claim it. What are reasonable means or what is a reasonable time in such a case, is a question of fact. It is not necessary that the finder should know who is the owner of the property, or that any particular person is the owner of it; it is sufficient if, at the time of appropriating it, he does not believe it to be his own property, or in good faith believe that the real owner cannot be found. Illustrations

(a) A finds a rupee on the high road, not knowing to whom the rupee belongs. A picks up the rupee. Here A has not committed the offence defined in this section.

(b) A finds a letter on the road, containing a bank note. From the direction and contents of the letter he learns to whom the note belongs. He appropriates the note. He is guilty of an of­fence under this section.

(c) A finds a cheque payable to bearer. He can form no conjecture as to the person who has lost the cheque. But the name of the person, who has drawn the cheque, appears. A knows that this person can direct him to the person in whose favour the cheque was drawn. A appropriates the cheque without attempting to dis­cover the owner. He is guilty of an offence under this section.

(d) A sees Z drop his purse with money in it. A picks up the purse with the intention of restoring it to Z, but afterwards appropriates it to his own use. A has committed an offence under this section.

(e) A finds a purse with money, not knowing to whom it belongs; he afterwards discovers that it belongs to Z, and appropriates it to his own use. A is guilty of an offence under this section.

(f) A finds a valuable ring, not knowing to whom it belongs. A sells it immediately without attempting to discover the owner. A is guilty of an offence under this section. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Punishment—Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both—Non-cogniz­able—Bailable—Triable by any Magistrate—Compoundable by the owner of the property misappropriated with the permission of the court. comments Dishonest misappropriation or conversion of property The words ’converts to his own use’ necessarily connote the use or dealing with the property in derogation of the rights of the owner; Ramaswami Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56. Ingreidents It has been held that the word ‘dishonestly’ and ‘misappropriate’ are necessary ingredients of an offence under section 403. Any dispute being about recovery of money is purely of civil nature. Hence a criminal complaint regarding such a matter is not maintainable, U. Dhar v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2003 SC 974.

(a) A, being executor to the will of a deceased person, dishon­estly disobeys the law which directs him to divide the effects according to the will, and appropriate them to his own use. A has committed criminal breach of trust.

(b) A is a warehouse-keeper. Z going on a journey, entrusts his furniture to A, under a contract that it shall be returned on payment of a stipulated sum for warehouse room. A dishonestly sells the goods. A has committed criminal breach of trust.

(c) A, residing in Calcutta, is agent for Z, residing at Delhi. There is an express or implied contract between A and Z, that all sums remitted by Z to A shall be invested by A, according to Z’s direction. Z remits a lakh of rupees to A, with directions to A to invest the same in Company’s paper. A dishonestly disobeys the direction and employs the money in his own business. A has com­mitted criminal breach of trust.

(d) But if A, in the last illustration, not dishonestly but in good faith, believing that it will be more for Z’s advantage to hold shares in the Bank of Bengal, disobeys Z’s directions, and buys shares in the Bank of Bengal, for Z, instead of buying Company’s paper, here, though Z should suffer loss, and should be entitled to bring a civil action against A, on account of that loss, yet A, not having acted dishonestly, has not committed criminal breach of trust.

(e) A, a revenue-officer, is entrusted with public money and is either directed by law, or bound by a contract, express or im­plied, with the Government, to pay into a certain treasury all the public money which he holds. A dishonestly appropriates the money. A has committed criminal breach of trust.

(f) A, a carrier, is entrusted by Z with property to be carried by land or by water. A dishonestly misappropriates the property. A has committed criminal breach of trust. Comments Criminal Conspiracy Sanction for prosecution is not necessary if a public servant is charged for offence of entering into a criminal conspiracy for committed breach of trust; State of Kerala v. Padmanabham Nair, 1999 Cr LJ 3696 (SC). Criminal breach of trust: Meaning and extent It must be proved that the beneficial interest in the property in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed was vested in some person other than the accused, and that the accused held that property on behalf of that person. A relationship is created between the transferor and transferee, whereunder the transferor remains the owner of the property and the transferee has legal custody of the property for the benefit of the transferor himself or transferee has only the custody of the property for the benefit of the transferor himself or someone else. At best, the transferee obtains in the property entrusted to him only special interest limited to claim for his charges in respect of its safe retention, and under no circumstances does he acquire a right to dispose of that property in contravention of the condition of the entrustment; Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 575. Entrustment The word entrusted in the section is very important unless there is entrustment, there can be no offence under the section; Ramaswami Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56.

(a) A, by falsely pretending to be in the Civil Service, inten­tionally deceives Z, and thus dishonestly induces Z to let him have on credit goods for which he does not mean to pay. A cheats.

(b) A, by putting a counterfeit mark on an article, intentionally deceives Z into a belief that this article was made by a certain celebrated manufacturer, and thus dishonestly induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.

(c) A, by exhibiting to Z a false sample of an article, inten­tionally deceives Z into believing that the article corresponds with the sample, and thereby, dishonestly induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.

(d) A, by tendering in payment for an article a bill on a house with which A keeps no money, and by which A expects that the bill will be dishonored, intentionally deceives Z, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to deliver the article, intending not to pay for it. A cheats.

(e) A, by pledging as diamonds article which he knows are not diamonds, intentionally deceives Z, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend money. A cheats.

(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money. A not intending to repay it. A cheats.

(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo plant which he does not intend to deliver, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to advance money upon the faith of such delivery. A cheats; but if A, at the time of obtaining the money, intends to deliver the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his contract and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract.

(h) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A has performed A’s part of a contract made with Z, which he has not performed, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to pay money. A cheats.

(i) A sells and conveys an estate to B. A, knowing that in conse­quence of such sale he has no right to the property, sells or mortgages the same to Z, without disclosing the fact of the previous sale and conveyance to B, and receives the purchase or mortgage money from Z. A cheats.

(a) A cheats by pretending to be a certain rich banker of the same name. A cheats by personation.

(b) A cheats by pretending to be B, a person who is deceased. A cheats by personation.

(a) A voluntarily burns a valuable security belonging to Z in­tending to cause wrongful loss to Z. A has committed mischief.

(b) A introduces water into an ice-house belonging to Z and thus causes the ice to melt, intending wrongful loss to Z. A has committed mischief.

(c) A voluntarily throws into a river a ring belonging to Z, with the intention of thereby causing wrongful loss to Z. A has com­mitted mischief.

(d) A, knowing that his effects are about to be taken in execu­tion in order to satisfy a debt due from him to Z, destroys those effects, with the intention of thereby preventing Z from obtain­ing satisfaction of the debt, and of thus causing damage to Z. A has committed mischief.

(e) A, having insured a ship, voluntarily causes the same to be cast away, with the intention of causing damage to the under-writers. A has committed mischief.

(f) A causes a ship to be cast away, intending thereby to cause damage to Z who has lent money on bottomry on the ship. A has committed mischief.

(g) A, having joint property with Z in a horse, shoots the horse, intending thereby to cause wrongful loss to Z. A has committed mischief.

(h) A causes cattle to enter upon a field belonging to Z, intend­ing to cause and knowing that he is likely to cause damage to Z’s crop. A has committed mischief.

(Orissa) —For section 441, the following section shall be substituted, namely:— “441. Criminal Trespass.—Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or, having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person or with intent to commit an offence, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, remains there with the intention of taking unauthorised possession or making unauthorised use of such property and fails to withdraw such property or its possession or use, when called upon to do so by that another person by notice in writing, duly served on him, is said to have commit “criminal trespass.“ [Vide Orissa Act 22 of 1986, sec. 2 (w.e.f. 6-12-1986)]. Uttar Pradesh.—For section 441, substitute the following:— “441. Criminal Trespass.—Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy and person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains therewith intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, or, having entered into or upon such property, whether before or after the coming into force of the Criminal Law (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1961, with the intention of taking unauthorised possession or making unauthorised use of such property fails to withdraw from such property or its possession or use, when called upon to do so by that another person by notice in writing, duly served upon him, by the date specified in the notice, is said to commit “criminal trespass”. [Vide Uttar Pradesh Act 31 of 1961, sec. 2 (w.e.f. 13-11-1961)].

(First) —If he enters or quits through a passage by himself, or by any abettor of the house-trespass, in order to the committing of the house-trespass.

(Secondly) —If he enters or quits through any passage not intended by any person, other than himself or an abettor of the offence, for human entrance; or through any passage to which he has ob­tained access by scaling or climbing over any wall or building.

(Thirdly) —If he enters or quits through any passage which he or any abettor of the house-trespass has opened, in order to the committing of the house-trespass by any means by which that passage was not intended by the occupier of the house to be opened.

(Fourthly) —If he enters or quits by opening any lock in order to the committing of the house-trespass, or in order to the quitting of the house after a house-trespass.

(Fifthly) —If he effects his entrance or departure by using crimi­nal force or committing an assault or by threatening any person with assault.

(Sixthly) —If he enters or quits by any passage which he knows to have been fastened against such entrance or departure, and to have been unfastened by himself or by an abettor of the house-trespass. Explanation.—Any out-house or building occupied with a house, and between which and such house there is an immediate internal communication, is part of the house within the meaning of this section. Illustrations

(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;

(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;

(c) affixes any ³⁴² [electronic signature] on any electronic record;

(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the ³⁴² [electronic signature],

(a) A has a letter of credit upon B for rupees 10,000 written by Z. A, in order to defraud B, adds a cipher to the 10,000, and makes the sum 1,00,000 intending that it may be believed by B that Z so wrote the letter. A has committed forgery.

(b) A, without Z ‘s authority, affixes Z ‘s seal to a document purporting to be a conveyance of an estate from Z to A, with the intention of selling the estate to B, and thereby of obtaining from B the purchase-money. A has committed forgery.

(c) A picks up a cheque on a banker signed by B, payable to bearer, but without any sum having been inserted in the cheque. A fraudulently fills up the cheque by inserting the sum of ten thousand rupees. A commits forgery.

(d) A leaves with B, his agent, a cheque on a banker, signed by A, without inserting the sum payable and authorizes B to fill up the cheque by inserting a sum not exceeding ten thousand rupees for the purpose of making certain payment. B fraudulently fills up the cheque by inserting the sum of twenty thousand rupees. B commits forgery.

(e) A draws a bill of exchange on himself in the name of B with­out B ‘s authority, intending to discount it as a genuine bill with a banker and intending to take up the bill on its maturity. Here, as A draws the bill with intent to deceive the banker by leading him to suppose that he had the security of B, and thereby to discount the bill, A is guilty of forgery.

(f) Z ‘s will contains the these words—“I direct that all my remaining property be equally divided between A, B and C .” A dishonestly scratches out B ‘s name, intending that it may be believed that the whole was left to himself and C. A has commit­ted forgery.

(g) A endorses a Government promissory note and makes it payable to Z or his order by writing on the bill the words “Pay to Z or his order” and signing the endorsement. B dishonestly erases the words “Pay to Z or his order”, and thereby converts the special endorsement into a blank endorsement. B commits forgery.

(h) A sells and conveys an estate to Z. A afterwards, in order to defraud Z of his estate, executes a conveyance of the same estate to B, dated six months earlier than the date of the conveyance to Z, intending it to be believed that he had conveyed the estate to B before he conveyed it to Z. A has committed forgery.

(i) Z dictates his will to A. A intentionally writes down a different legatee from the legatee named by Z, and by represent­ing to Z that he has prepared the will according to his instruc­tions, induces Z to sign the will. A has committed forgery.

(j) A writes a letter and signs it with B ‘s name without B ‘s authority, certifying that A is a man of good character and in distressed circumstances from unforeseen misfortune, intending by means of such letter to obtain alms from Z and other persons. Here, as A made a false document in order to induce Z to part with property. A has committed forgery.

(k) A without B ‘s authority writes a letter and signs it in B ‘s name certifying to A ‘s character, intending thereby to obtain employment under Z. A has committed forgery in as much as he intended to deceive Z by the forged certificate, and thereby to induce Z to enter into an express or implied contract for serv­ice. Explanation 1. —A man’s signature of his own name may amount to forgery. Illustrations

(a) A signs his own name to a bill of exchange, intending that it may be believed that the bill was drawn by another person of the same name. A has committed forgery.

(b) A writes the word “accepted” on a piece of paper and signs it with Z ‘s name, in order that B may afterwards write on the paper a bill of exchange drawn by B upon Z, and negotiate the bill as though it had been accepted by Z. A is guilty of forgery; and if B, knowing the fact, draws the bill upon the paper pursuant to A ‘s intention, B is also guilty of forgery.

(c) A picks up a bill of exchange payable to the order of a different person of the same name. A endorses the bill in his own name, intending to cause it to be believed that it was endorsed by the person whose order it was payable; here A has committed forgery.

(d) A purchases an estate sold under execution of a decree against B. B, after the seizure of the estate, in collusion with Z, executes a lease of the estate of Z at a nominal rent and for a long period and dates the lease six months prior to the sei­zure, with intent to defraud A, and to cause it to be believed that the lease was granted before the seizure. B, though he executes the lease in his own name, commits forgery by antedating it.

(e) A, a trader, in anticipation of insolvency, lodges effects with B for A ‘s benefit, and with intent to defraud his creditors; and in order to give a colour to the transaction, writes a prom­issory note binding himself to pay to B a sum for value received, and antedates the note, intending that it may be believed to have been made before. A was on the point of insolvency. A has commit­ted forgery under the first head of the definition. Explanation 2. —The making of a false document in the name of a fictitious person, intending it to be believed that the document was made by a real person, or in the name of a deceased person, intending it to be believed that the document was made by the person in his lifetime, may amount to forgery. Illustration A draws a bill of exchange upon a fictitious person, and fraudu­lently accepts the bill in the name of such fictitious person with intent to negotiate it. A commits forgery. ³⁴³ [ Explanation 3.— For the purposes of this section, the expression “affixing 2 [electronic signature]” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.]

(1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.]

(a) that, having taken all reasonable precautions against commit­ting an offence against this section, he had at the time of the commission of the alleged offence no reason to suspect the genu­ineness of the mark, and

(b) that, on demand made by or on behalf of the prosecutor, he gave all the information in his power with respect to the persons from whom he obtained such goods or things, or

(c) that otherwise he had acted innocently, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.]

(1) Whoever makes, or causes to be made, or uses for any purpose whatsoever, or delivers to any person, any document purporting to be, or in any way resembling, or so nearly resem­bling as to be calculated to deceive, any currency-note or bank-note shall be punished with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees.

(2) If any person, whose name appears on a document the making of which is an offence under sub-section (1), refuses, without lawful excuse, to disclose to a police-officer on being so re­quired the name and address of the person by whom it was printed or otherwise made, he shall be punished with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.

(3) Where the name of any person appears on any document in respect of which any person is charged with an offence under sub-section (1) or on any other document used or distributed in connection with that document it may, until the contrary is proved, be presumed that person caused the document to be made.]

(Exception) —This section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge.

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.]

(a) A says—“Z is an honest man; he never stole B’s watch”; in­tending to cause it to be believed that Z did steal B’s watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.

(b) A is asked who stole B’s watch. A points to Z, intending to cause it to be believed that Z stole B’s watch. This is defama­tion unless it fall within one of the exceptions.

(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B’s watch, intending it to be believed that Z stole B’s watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions. First Exception.—Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.—It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact. Second Exception.—Public conduct of public servants.—It is not defamation to express in a good faith any opinion whatever re­specting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Third Exception.—Conduct of any person touching any public question.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Illustration It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting Z’s conduct in petitioning Government on a public question, in signing a requisition for a meeting on a public question, in presiding or attending a such meeting, in forming or joining any society which invites the public support, in voting or canvassing for a particular candidate for any situa­tion in the efficient discharges of the duties of which the public is interested. Fourth Exception.—Publication of reports of proceedings of Courts.—It is not defamation to publish substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of any such proceedings. Explanation.—A Justice of the Peace or other officer holding an inquiry in open Court preliminary to a trial in a Court of Jus­tice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section. Fifth Exception.—Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others concerned.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Illustrations

(a) A says—“I think Z’s evidence on that trial is so contradic­tory that he must be stupid or dishonest”. A is within this exception if he says this is in good faith, in as much as the opin­ion which he expresses respects Z’s character as it appears in Z’s conduct as a witness, and no further.

(b) But if A says—“I do not believe what Z asserted at that trial because I know him to be a man without veracity”; A is not within this exception, in as much as the opinion which he express of Z’s character, is an opinion not founded on Z’s conduct as a witness. Sixth Exception.—Merits of public performance.—It is not defa­mation to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the judgment of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character appears in such performance, and no further. Explanation.—A performance may be substituted to the judgment of the public expressly or by acts on the part of the author which imply such submission to the judgment of the public. Illustrations

(a) A person who publishes a book, submits that book to the judgment of the public.

(b) A person who makes a speech in public, submits that speech to the judgment of the public.

(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public stage, submits his acting or signing in the judgment of the public.

(d) A says of a book published by Z—“Z’s book is foolish; Z must be a weak man. Z’s book is indecent; Z must be a man of impure mind”. A is within the exception, if he says this in good faith, in as much as the opinion which he expresses of Z respects Z’s character only so far as it appears in Z’s book, and no further.

(e) But if A says—“I am not surprised that Z’s book is foolish and indecent, for he is a weak man and a libertine”. A is not within this exception, in as much as the opinion which he expresses of Z’s character is an opinion not founded on Z’s book. Seventh Exception.—Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over another.—It is not defamation in a person having over another any authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates. Illustration A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness, or of an officer of the Court; a head of a department censuring in good faith those who are under his orders; a parent censuring in good faith a child in the presence of other children; a school-master, whose authority is derived from a parent, censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of other pupils; a master censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in service; a banker censur­ing in good faith the cashier of his bank for the conduct of such cashier as such cashier—are within this exception. Eighth Exception.—Accusation preferred in good faith to autho­rised person.—It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation. Illustration If A in good faith accuse Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z’s master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, and child, to Z’s father—A is within this exception. Ninth Exception.—Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests.—It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the inter­ests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good. Illustrations

(a) A, a shopkeeper, says to B, who manages his business—“Sell nothing to Z unless he pays you ready money, for I have no opin­ion of his honesty”. A is within the exception, if he has made this imputation on Z in good faith for the protection of his own interests.

(b) A, a Magistrate, in making a report of his own superior offi­cer, casts an imputation on the character of Z. Here, if the imputation is made in good faith, and for the public good, A is within the exception. Tenth Exception.—Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good.—It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is inter­ested, or for the public good. COMMENTS Imputation without publication In section 499 the words “makes or publishes any imputation” should be interpreted as words supple­menting to each other. A maker of imputation without publication is not liable to be punished under that section; Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 7 Supreme Today 127.

(1) ] Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report,—

(3) Offence under sub-section (2) committed in place of worship, etc.—Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (2) in any place of worship or in an assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.]

(a) A sits dhurna at Z’s door with the intention of causing it to be believed that, by so sitting, he renders Z an object of Divine displeasure. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(b) A threatens Z that, unless Z performs a certain act, A will kill one of A’s own children, under such circumstances that the killing would be believed to render Z an object of Divine dis­pleasure. A has committed the offence defined in this section. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Punishment—Imprisonment for 1 year, or fine, or both—Non-cogniza­ble—Bailable—Triable by any Magistrate—Compoundable by the person against whom the offence was committed.

(a) A makes an attempt to steal some jewels by breaking open a box, and finds after so opening the box, that there is no jewel in it. He has done an act towards the commission of theft, and therefore is guilty under this section.

(b) A makes an attempt to pick the pocket of Z by thrusting his hand into Z’s pocket. A fails in the attempt in consequence of Z’s having nothing in his pocket. A is guilty under this section. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Punishment—Imprisonment for life or imprisonment not exceeding half of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine, or both—According as the offence is cognizable or non-cognizable—According as the offence attempted by the offender is bailable or not—Triable by the court by which the offence attempted is tri­able—Non-compoundable. comments Moral guilt and injury Section 511 is a general provision dealing with attempts to commit offences not made punishable by other specific sections. It makes punishable all attempts to commit offences punishable with imprisonment and not only those punishable with death. An attempt is made punishable, because every attempt, although it falls short of success, must create alarm, which by itself is an injury, and the moral guilt of the offender is the same as if he had succeeded. Moral guilt must be united to injury in order to justify punishment. As the injury is not as great as if the act had been committed, only half the punishment is awarded. Attempt to commit an offence can be said to begin when the preparations are complete and the culprit commences to do something with the intention of committing the offence and which is a step towards the commission of the offence. The moment culprit commences to do an act with the necessary intention, he commences his attempt to commit the offence. The word “attempt” is not itself defined, and must, therefore, be taken in its ordinary meaning. This is exactly what the provisions of section 511 require; Koppula Venkat Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2004) 3 SCC 602.